Euthydemus - Well then, Ctesippus, do you think it is possible to tell a lie?
This dialogue appears in Plato's "Euthydemus" (283e-284b). Euthydemus argues that it is not possible to tell a lie. There must be something deeply wrong and misguided with doctrines that preclude the possibility of falsehoods in ordinary speech. Such doctrines were, however, common currency in Plato's Athens among the sophists, and they can be traced to the stage influence of Parmenides. In the "Sophist" Plato tries to rebut these doctrines and make sense of falsehoods. This task took Plato one long argument. In the two following papers, I explain what is wrong with Parmenides' view and describe Plato's long winded argument.
Concerning the published papers, please note that what is posted are manuscripts from which the published versions were created. There will be some differences between the manuscripts and the published versions. Should you actually want to cite a paper, please consult the published version.
A two-worlds, two-semantics interpretation of Plato's Sophist. In: Greek Philosophy and Epistemology, volume II (ed. Constantine Boudouris), Ionia Publications 2001, Athens, pp. 61-68.
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